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Large, short-run fluctuations in the birth rate have been an important demographic feature
of industrialized, low-fertility populations in the twentieth century. Since females normally marry
men who are two or three years older than themselves, these fluctuations result in large imbalances
between the size of male and female cohorts who would normally marry each other. These imbal-
ances must somehow be resolved, either by a change in traditional patterns of age at marriage or
by changes in the proportions of the population of one sex or the other who ever marry.
Following a suggestion of Becker (1973,1974,1981), we have developed a developed an imple-
mentable general equilibrium model of marriage assignments, which can be used to predict the way
in which marriage patterns adjust to change in the numbers of males and females in each cohort.
This model poses equilibrium in the marriage market as an application of the linear programming
assignment problem, which was introduced to economics by Koopmans and Beckman (1957). For
the purposes of this paper, we suppose that persons of the same sex differ only by the year in which
they were born. Each individual has a preferred age of marriage. Any two people who marry each
other must, of course, marry at the same time. Therefore, the total payoff to a marriage between
any male and female is a function of the age difference between them. The more their age difference
diverges from the difference between their preferred ages at marriage, the greater must be the loss
of utility to one or both from marrying at an age that is not ideal. If we posit a particular payoff
structure to marriages as a function of the age of marriage of each partner, then given the size of
each cohort, we can compute the optimal assignment of marriage partners by cohort. The fit of
the predicted assignments from our model can then be compared with actual marriage patterns.
Swedish marriage patterns during the twentieth century are ideal for testing our assignment
model. Excellent data exist on marriages and cohort size for single years of age and single calendar
years going back to the 1890's. Dramatic fluctuations in fertility in Sweden have created large
differences between the size of male and female cohorts who would normally marry each other.
Nevertheless, the median age difference between husbands and wives has remained in the range
of two or three years. We hope to use our assignment model to shed some light on the way that
the marriage market absorbed these cohort size changes. As we will show, the simple form of
the assignment model that we present in this paper is partially, but not entirely successful in this
endeavor.
The first section of the paper presents descriptive statistics of marriage patterns in twentieth
century Sweden. We follow this with an outline of our equilibrium theory of marriage assignment.
Finally, we compare actual marriage patterns with those predicted by a simple implementation of
our model which assumes that the difference between preferred age of marriage for the two sexes
did not change over the entire period.
1
Cohort Size and Age-at-Marriage in Twentieth Century Sweden
Sweden experienced sharp fluctuations in fertility during the twentieth century. This is demon-
strated in Figure 1, which shows Swedish cohort size fluctuations for the years 1883 to 1942. The
figure plots the size of female birth cohorts in Sweden, evaluated when the females are age 15. As
the figure demonstrates, Sweden experienced a sharp peak in fertility in 1920 and a major trough
in the early 1930's. This decline was followed by a rapid increase into the 1940's.
The large changes in cohort size in Sweden over this period cause dramatic imbalances in the
sex ratios typically used to analyze marriage squeezes. Figure 2 shows the sex ratio that we will use
throughout the paper, the number of potential husbands available to women born in a given year
if every woman married a man three years older. Specifically, the sex ratio shown is the ratio of
the number of males born in year t - 3 (measured at age 15) to the number of females born in year
t (also measured at age 15).1 The figure shows, for example, that if every woman married a man
three years older, the 1923 cohort of women would have had more than 1.25 potential husbands
for every woman, while the 1942 cohort would have had less than .9 potential husbands for every
woman.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 demonstrate secular trends in Swedish marriage patterns, trends which
are similar to those of many other European populations the twentieth century. Figure 3 shows the
mean age at marriage for male and female birth cohorts, conditional on marriage by age 40.2 The
mean age at marriage fell sharply for both men and women, declining by around three years for
both sexes between the 1900 cohort and the 1940 cohort. In spite of the large changes in the mean
age at marriage for both sexes, the difference between these ages remained in the range of two to
three years through the entire period. This persistent difference in mean age at marriage must
imply that husbands are on average older than their wives by two to three years of age throughout
this period. The consistency of the gap between the mean age at marriage for males and the mean
age at marriage for women is especially striking when confronted with the sharp fluctuations in sex
ratios shown in Figure 2.
Figure 4 shows the cumulative proportions of men and women in each cohort who married
before age 40. Over time, these proportions increase sharply for both sexes, with a larger increase
For example, the point plotted for year of birth 1920 is the size of the 1917 male birth cohort at age 15 (i.e.
the number of 15 year old males in 1932) divided by the size of the 1920 female birth cohort at age 15 (i.e. the
number of 15 year old females in 1935). If all females married men three years older, the graph shows the ratio
of eligible females to eligible males for each female birth cohort.
2 We truncate the cohort marriage histories at age 40 for calculation of both the mean age at marriage and the
proportions marrying in the results presented here. We use age 40 in order to maximize the number of cohorts
with comparable histories while still including the greatest part of each cohort's marriage experience. We have
compared these results with results using age 45 and 50 as the truncation for those cohorts which permit such
comparisons. None of the general patterns we indicate here are sensitive to the use of age 40 as the truncation
point.
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Figure 1. Cohort size fluctuations in Sweden, 1883-1942. Size of female cohort born in year t,
evaluated at age 15.
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Figure 2. Male/female sex ratios in Sweden, 1883-1942. Number of males born in year t - 3
divided by number of females born in year I; both sexes evaluated at age 15.
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for women than for men. The proportion of women married by age 40 (a number only slightly
smaller than the proportion of women who eventually marry) rose from slightly over 60% before
1900 to over 95% in the late 1920's. After 1930, there is a decline in the proportion of females who
marry, while the proportions of males who marry stays roughly constant.
The fluctuations of cohort size and of sex ratios documented in Figure 1 and Figure 2 could
be resolved in the marriage market in two possible ways. One response is that the fluctuations
lead to changes in the proportions of males or females marrying for each cohort. For example, one
simple adjustment would be that the number of females who marry is determined entirely by the
supply of potential husbands, with the proportion of females marrying absorbing all fluctuations
in sex ratios. A second way of resolving these imbalances is through changes in the age difference
between husbands and wives.
The following analogy may help one to see how the adjustment works. Suppose that men and
women are entering a ballroom through separate doors, and we have the task of assigning partners
to those that enter. If the males and females file into the room at the same speed then we can
simply pair up each man with the woman that enters at the same time. But if the men begin to
flow into the room faster than the women, this won't work. We have two options. One is to let the
number of matches be determined by the slower flow of entering women. "Surplus" males might
be turned away (or put in storage near the refrigerator). Alternatively, we might try to reach back
into the line of women to find partners for every man that enters. Although this could not work as
a permanent solution if the men continued to enter faster than the women, it could be a successful
strategy if the speeds of the two lines will eventually adjust so that the women enter faster than
the men. Thus we might succeed in assigning a partner to each man and woman in spite of the
short-run problem caused by the different speeds at which the two groups enter the room.
When husbands tend to be older than their wives, fluctuating cohort sizes create exactly this
kind of problem. If cohort sizes are relatively constant then men and women can form marriages
with a two or three year age difference between spouses without difficulty. A temporary decrease
in fertility, however, will be analogous to women beginning to enter the ballroom at a slower speed,
since younger cohorts will be smaller than their predecessors. We would predict then, that the
marriage market would have to respond with some combination of a decrease in the proportion
of males marrying and an increase in the age difference between spouses. The increase in the age
difference corresponds to reaching further down the line of women to find matches for all of the
men in the ballroom analogy above. An increase in fertility would have the opposite effect, leading
to increases in the relative proportion of males from previous cohorts marrying and a decrease in
the age difference between spouses.
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Figure 3. Mean age at marriage for males and females, Sweden, 1883-1942, by year of birth,
conditional on marriage by age 40.
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Figure 4. Proportions marrying by age 40, males and females, Sweden, 1883-1942, by year of
birth; conditional on marriage by age 40.
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Swedish marriage data make it possible to analyze adjustments in both the age difference
between spouses and in proportions marrying in response to cohort size fluctuations. Figure 5
presents evidence on the potential contribution of changes in the age difference between spouses
in absorbing the large fluctuations in cohort size in Sweden over the period 1883-1942. Published
data do not exist giving cross-tabulations of age of husband by age of wife in single years of age.
An approximate time series for the age difference between husbands and wives can be constructed
by comparing the mean age of marriage for women with the mean age of marriage for men born
three years earlier, roughly corresponding to the average cohort these women marry into. Figure
5 presents a time series of the difference between the mean age at marriage of female cohorts and
the mean age at marriage of males from the cohort three years older. Figure 5 also shows the sex
ratio (the ratio of males born in year t - 3 to females born in year 1) for comparison.
Figure 6 presents a series that compares the proportion of females married by age 40 in each
cohort with the proportion of males married by age 40 in the cohort born three years earlier.
Specifically, the graph shows the ratio of the proportion of women married by age 40 in the to the
proportion of men married by age 40 in the cohort born three years earlier. The figure also shows
the sex ratio (the ratio of males born in year t - 3 to females born in year t) for comparison.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 indicate that both husband-wife age differences and relative proportions
marrying move in directions consistent with the adjustments implied by long term and short term
changes in sex ratios. The male-female sex ratio begins to increase above unity beginning around
1900. At the same time, the age gap between spouses begins to rise and the relative proportion
of males marrying begins to decrease. The effects of short term fluctuations can be seen in the
experience of the unusually large 1920 cohort. The reduced male-female sex ratios caused by the
fertility boom around 1920 are associated with a decline in the age gap between spouses and a
decrease in the relative proportion of females marrying, in comparison to adjacent cohorts. The
decrease in the male/female sex ratio beginning in the mid 1920's, a result of the slowdown and
eventual reversal of the major fertility decline of previous decades, also leads to a decline in the
age difference between spouses and a decrease in the relative proportion of females marrying.
In order to look more closely at the relationship between the sex ratio and the age difference,
we present estimates of a regression using the time series of the age difference between spouses
and the male-female sex ratio. Table 1 shows the results of the regression for the set of cohorts
born from 1883 to 1942, the cohorts for which our data provide complete marriage histories up
to age 40. The results show a statistically significant effect in the predicted direction. Higher sex
ratios (i.e. ratios of males born in year t - 3 to females born in year t) lead to increases in the age
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Figure 5. Sex ratio and husband-wife age differences, Sweden, 1883-1942. Sex Ratio: Number of
males born in year t - 3 divided by number of females born in year t. Age Difference: Mean age at
marriage of men born in year t - 3 minus mean age at marriage of women born in year t.
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Figure 6. Sex ratio and relative proportions of males and females marrying, Sweden, 1883-1942.
Sex Ratio: Number of males born in year t - 3 divided by number of females born in year t.
Relative Proportions Marrying: Proportion married by age 40 of women born in year t divided by
proportion married by age 40 of men born in year t - 3.
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difference between husbands and wives for that pair of cohorts.
3 
Specifically, the results imply that
an increase in the sex ratio by .1 will raise the age difference between spouses by .23 years. The
predicted mean age difference between husbands and wives when the sex ratio is 1 is about 2.75
years. The R2 for the regression indicates that fluctuations in sex ratios alone can explain 35% of
the variance in the age difference between spouses over this 60 year period.
The relationship between the sex ratio and the age difference between spouses can be seen
more directly in Figure 7, which shows a scatterplot of the age difference plotted against the sex
ratio. The figure also shows the ordinary least squares regression line for the regression of the age
difference on the sex ratio shown in Table 1. The plot shows a clear relationship in the predicted
direction, with increases in the relative supply of potential husbands leading to increases in the age
gap between husbands and wives, a result consistent with the demographic constraint on marriage
market equilibrium.
A similar regression demonstrates that proportions marrying also respond to changes in the
sex ratio in Sweden during this period. Table 2 presents estimates of an OLS regression in which
the dependent variable is the ratio of the proportion of males married in the cohort born in year
t - 3 to the proportion of females married in the cohort born in year t. This is the inverse of
the ratio shown in Figure 6. Once again, the results show a statistically significant effect in the
predicted direction. In this case a higher sex ratio (males born in year t - 3 to females born in year
t) leads to a decrease in the relative proportion of males marrying for that pair of cohorts. The R
2
for the regression indicates that fluctuations in sex ratios alone can explain 43% of the variance in
the relative proportions of males and females marrying over the period 1883-1942.
Figure 8 plots the ratio of proportions marrying and the predicted proportions implied by the
regression in Table 2. The results imply that at a sex ratio of unity only 93.2% as many men
marry as women. This is partly a result of the fact that only marriage histories up to age 40 are
used, although the discrepancy between proportions of males and females marrying persists when
marriage histories up until age 50 are used. The regression implies that an increase in the sex ratio
from I to 1.1 would decrease the relative proportion of men marrying from .932 to .889. If all of the
10% "surplus" of men were to go unmarried, then the relative proportion of men marrying would
decline to .9 x .932 = .838.4 The change in the proportion marrying, then, accounts for something
a More precisely, it leads to increases in the difference between the mean age at marriage of men born in year
t - 3 and the mean age at marriage of women born in year t, our proxy for the mean age difference between
husbands and wives for women born in year t.
4 The ratio shown is the ratio p = M", "', where M; is the number married from sex i and Ni is the total
number eligible for sex i. If we increase N, by 10% and leave all other values constant, p will decrease to
p/1.1 s .9p.
Table 1
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
Age Difference Between Husband and Wife
By Male-Female Sex Ratio
Sweden, 1883-1942
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic Mean Standard Deviation
Age Difference (Dependent Variable) 2.842 0.268
Sex Ratio 2.2608 0.4036 5.601 1.037 0.070
Constant 0.4979 0.4194 1.187
R2  .3510
N 60
Notes: Dependent variable is the difference between the mean age at marriage of males born in
year t - 3 and the mean age marriage of females born in year t. The sex ratio is the ratio of the
number of males born in year t - 3 (evaluated at age 15) to the number of women born in year t
(evaluated at age 15).
Table 2
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
Ratio of Proportion of Males and Females Marrying
By Male-Female Sex Ratio
Sweden, 1883-1942
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic Mean Standard Deviation
Pm(t - 3)/P1(t) (Dependent Variable) .920 0.038
Sex Ratio -.3458 0.0536 -6.447 1.037 0.070
Constant 1.2786 0.0557 22.944
R2  .4262
N 60
Notes: Dependent variable is the ratio of the proportion married by age 40 for males born in year
t - 3 to the proportion married by age 40 for females born in year t. The sex ratio is the ratio of
the number of males born in year t - 3 (evaluated at age 15) to the number of women born in year
t (evaluated at age 15).
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Figure 7. Scatter plot, sex ratio and husband-wife age differences, Sweden, 1883-1942. Mean age
at marriage of men born in year t - 3 minus mean age at marriage of women born in year t, and
least squares regression line.
less than half of the response to the fluctuating sex ratio, with adjustments in the age difference
between spouses working to absorb the remainder.
Marriage Markets and The Linear Programming Assignment Algorithm
We believe that the descriptive data presented in the previous section can be better understood
as the equilibrium of a marriage market in which marriage behavior must respond to the supply and
demand for each sex and each cohort. In such a model, we would expect that persons of the same
sex but different ages would be substitutes, albeit imperfect substitutes, with persons being closer
substitutes the closer their ages. In contrast to our equilibrium model, earlier, "one-sex" models of
marriage would find historical averages of age-specific marriage rates for one sex, (usually female)
and apply these rates to later age distributions in order to project the number of marriages that
will take place in subsequent periods. As should be evident from the descriptive statistics that we
have just presented, a severe weakness of this approach is that a male one-sex model would predict
very different numbers of marriages in any period than a female one-sex model. 5
Pollak (1986, 1987) has reformulated the "two-sex problem" by replacing the constant age-
specific fertility schedule of the classical theory with more fundamental relationships. These are a
"birth matrix" and a "mating rule." The birth matrix postulates an expected number of births
per period from a marriage of an age i male to an age j female. The mating rule is a function
that determines the number of marriages of type i males to type j females for all i and j as
a function of the vector listing the numbers of males and females of each age and sex in the
population. Pollak shows that if these relationships remain constant over time and if the mating
rule follows certain natural conditions, the dynamical system so defined will converge to a constant
equilibrium growth rate, yielding a constant equilibrium age structure. Pollak imposes only certain
very general conditions on the mating function such as nonnegativity, homogeneity, continuity, and
that the number of persons of a given sex who marry must not exceed the number of persons of
that age and sex in the population.
Pollak's mating rule can be thought of as a "reduced form" description of the dependence
on the outcome of a marriage market on supplies and demands of the two sexes from various
cohorts. Our model looks behind this reduced form by posing an explicit structure of payoffs to
the possible patterns of mating. We can then analyze marriage market equilibrium under this
structure. In particular, we take advantage of an idea proposed by Becker (1981), who suggested
that the problem of finding an efficient and stable assignment of marriage partners can be usefully
viewed as an application of the linear programming assignment problem.
One-sex models, and their weaknesses are discussed in detail by Keyfitz (1971), McFarland(1972), Mahsam
(1974), Das Gupta (1974), Schoen (1981), Sanderson (1983), Pollak (1986, 1987) and Caswell and Weeks
(1986).)
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The assignment problem was originally devised as a model for the efficient assignment of
workers to jobs. For each worker, i, in job, j, there is a money value of output a;, which could be
produced if worker i is assigned job j. The assignment problem finds the assignment of workers to
jobs that maximizes the total value of output subject to the constraint that each worker has only
one job and each job is done by only one worker. The solution to the assignment problem not only
reveals an optimal assignment, but it also imputes "shadow prices" to each worker and job in such
a way that if each worker were paid his shadow price as a wage and each job received its shadow
price as a rent, the optimal assignment would be a competitive equilibrium.
It would be reasonable to apply the assignment problem to the case of marital sorting if the
"value" of a marriage could be measured by a single number like money income. On the face of it,
this seems an outrageous simplification of what marriage is about. In a marriage there are many
joint decisions to be made about many matters that are far removed from money. There also may be
substantial differences in tastes, in skills, and in initial wealth between potential marriage partners.
As it turns out, we have been able to show that the complexity of interaction in a marriage can be
quite well modeled by the presence of a large number of shared public goods in the marriage. For
a broad and interesting class of preferences over public and private goods, it happens that there
is "transferable utility". This means that although many complex joint decisions must be reached
about household public goods, the efficient amount of public goods in a marriage is determined
independently of the distribution of private goods within the marriage. When this is true, the
assignment problem model of marriage as proposed by Becker can be applied directly.6
We present here a simple model of the marriage market that is empirically implementable
and yet rich enough to capture much of the character of the marriage squeeze. Suppose that an
individual's utility depends only on his or her age at marriage and on consumption of private goods.
Of course, any two people who choose to marry each other must marry on the same day. This effect
can be nicely modeled by treating the date of the wedding as a local public good, entering into
both of the potential partners' utility functions. Each person's wedding date enters their utility
function because this date determines their age of marriage.
Let A be person i's preferred age at marriage. To enable us to empirically fit our model,
suppose that individual i has a quadratic loss function for marrying at a less than ideal age. In
particular, let C, be person i's consumption of private goods, let W, be the year of i's marriage
and B, the year of person i's birth. Then A; = W; - B, is i's age at marriage. Let A be i's most
6 A detailed description of how this works out can be found in Bergstrom and Cornes (1981,1983). For an -
application to the issue of assortative mating see Lam (1988).
preferred age of marriage. Then let person i's utility be given by
U;(W, B;, C,) = C, - [(W, - B;) - AJ 2.
Suppose now that malei and female j are contemplating marriage. Their utility functions belong
to the class of utility functions for which the optimal choice of public goods is independent of how
the private goods are distributed in the marriage. As demonstrated in Bergstrom and Lam (1989),
the implication of these special functions is that the optimal time for i and j to marry if they do
marry is exactly half way between the favorite date ofi and the favorite date of j.
Consider, for example, a male i born in 1924 and a female j born in 1926. Suppose that i's
preferred age at marriage is 25 and j's preferred age at marriage was 21. Then i would prefer to
marry in 1949 and j would prefer to marry in 1947. The efficient time for this couple to marry
if they do marry would be in 1948. In this case, each person would be missing his or her favorite
age of marriage by one year. Because of the special utility function that we have assumed, the
model displays transferable utility. That is, for any two people i and j of opposite sexes, there is
a number Ail which is the total utility generated by an optimally timed marriage between i and
j. Persons i and j can divide this utility in any way that adds up to A,, by redistributing private
goods between them.
Suppose that all males preferred to marry at age Am and that all females preferred to marry
at age Af. Then, given the assumption of a quadratic loss function, we can find the payoff matrix
which reports the value Aij of a marriage between a cohort i male and a cohort j female. This
is the structure we will impose in order to apply our model to Sweden. Since we know from our
historical series the number of persons of each cohort and sex, once we impose a payoff matrix we
can solve a linear program to assign the cohorts to each other in an optimal way.
Comparing Predicted to Actual Swedish Marriage Patterns
The equilibrium model that we will compare with the Swedish historical data is one of extreme
simplicity. We assume that individuals do not care who they marry, but only care about when
they marry. While we will allow the possibility that the preferred age of marriage for each sex
has changed over time, we will assume that the difference between the preferred marriage age of
males and the preferred marriage age of females has been constant throughout the entire period
and is equal to 3 years. Specifically, we assume that matrix of payoffs to possible pairings of male
and female cohorts is that shown in Figure 9. The zeros along the third super-diagonal indicate
that marriages of males from a given cohort to females from the cohort born three years later are
the "best" marriages. The negative numbers indicate a utility loss compared to the ideal marriage
12 13
for all other marriages, with the penalty increasing quadratically away from the diagonal of ideal
marriages.
Given this payoff matrix, we will use a linear programming algorithm to solve for the assignment
of partners that maximizes the total payoff from marriages in the population of men and women
born in Sweden between 1895 and 1945. More precisely, these cohorts were measured by the number
of persons of each cohort and sex who reached age 15 in Sweden between 1910 and 1960. In this
way we avoid statistical problems caused by sex differences in infant mortality. This procedure
also allows us to consider only persons who were in Sweden after 1910, at which time emigration
from Sweden had essentially ceased. Given this payoff matrix, we calculate the optimal assignment
of partners, assuming that all males and females who reach the age of 15 are assigned marriage
partners. One difficulty that has to be resolved is what to do about people born between 1895 and
1945 who married partners who were born outside of this interval. We chose to follow the simple
procedure of assuming that all women born in 1895, 1896, and 1897 married men who were born
three years earlier than they and to assume that all men born in 1943, 1944, and 1945 married
women who were three years older than themselves. Therefore the population of people actually
matched to each other by our assignment algorithm are the set of men born in the years from 1895
to 1942 and the set of women born in the years from 1898 to 1945.
The solution to our assignment problem is a 50 by 50 matrix whose ijth element is the number
of males born in year i who marry females born in year j. In fact this assignment matrix is
very sparse, with positive numbers of marriages concentrated close to the third super-diagonal,
the diagonal corresponding to "ideal" marriages. Actual demographic data on the distribution of
age differences between marriage partners will be much more dispersed than our predicted optimal
assignments. The lack of dispersion predicted by our model comes from the fact that we have
assumed that persons of the same age are all identical. If we were to allow a distribution of maturity
levels among people of the same chronological level, we would obtain more realistic predictions on
this account. But even our very simple model will make interesting predictions about the time path
of the mean age difference between husbands and wives. For a given cohort of men, for example,
we calculate the mean year of birth of the wives assigned to that cohort by our linear program.
Using this to calculate the mean age difference between spouses for each cohort, we can compare
our results to actual Swedish experience.
Figure 10 shows the mean age difference for husbands and wives for every female birth cohort
resulting from our linear program. The line marked with circles corresponds to our assignments.
The line marked with triangles reproduces the actual data for Sweden for the same years, based
on the series shown above in Figure 5. The graph has both good news and bad news regarding the
ability of our simulated assignments to capture the actual history of age differences between spouses
Female Birth Cohort j
... 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 ...
1920 ... -9 -4 -1 0 -1 -4 -9 ...
Male 1921 ... -16 -9 -4 -1 0 -1 -4 ---
Birth 1922 ... -25 -16 -9 -4 -1 0 -1 ...
Cohort 1923 ... -36 -25 -16 -9 -4 -1 0 ...
i 1924 ... -49 -36 -25 -16 -9 -4 -1 ...
1925 ... -64 -49 -36 -25 -16 -9 -4 ...
1926 ... -81 -64 -49 -36 -25 -16 -9 ...
Figure 9. Payoff matrix for Swedish marriage assignments. Total utility from a marriage between
male born in year i and female born in year j given quadratic loss function and three year difference
in ideal age at marriage for males and females.
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Figure 10. Husband-wife age differences, Sweden, 1895-1945. Actual differences and differences
predicted by linear program assignment algorithm.
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in Sweden. For the period 1905 to 1923 our assignments track actual experience remarkably well.
The most dramatic result is the similarity in the way out assignments deal with the extreme sex
ratio fluctuations between 1915 and 1925. Since these are the largest short-run fluctuations in the
age difference we actually observe in Sweden, our ability to replicate them is encouraging.
As can be seen in Figure 10, our assignments begin to diverge from actual Swedish experience,
starting with the cohorts born in the late 1920's. These are the people whose marriages took
place in the 1950's and later. Our assignments predict that the age difference between husbands
and wives would increase during this period, when in fact the actual age difference declined quite
steadily until the end of our period of observation.
Evidently our model is not capturing something that happened during the last part of the
period. We can think of at least two important effects that we have left out. One omission is that
we fitted our optimal assignments based on the assumption that all members of both sexes choose
to marry. This would make no difference to the accuracy of our predictions if the proportions of
each sex who marry were constant throughout the period. As Figure 8 indicates, the proportion of
members of a given sex and cohort who marry is inversely related to the abundance of its members
relative to size of the sex-cohort group from which it would normally select marriage partners.
These effects would tend to moderate the fluctuations in the age gap between marriage partners
that are induced by changes in the relative cohort sizes.
The most suspect of our assumptions is probably the assumption that the optimal age differ-
ential for couples remained constant over the entire period. As Figure 3 shows, there was a steady
secular decline in the mean age of marriage for the cohorts born after 1905, with a slightly faster
decline for males than for females. If the preferred age of marriage for females fell at exactly the
same rate as the preferred age of marriage for males, then their would be nothing wrong with our
assumption that the optimal age differential remained constant. But, quite possibly, these preferred
ages have not fallen at the same rate and the optimal age difference has therefore diminished. This
issue, too will be addressed in later work.
Conclusions
Swedish cohort size and marriage experience during the twentieth century present intriguing
questions. The age difference between husbands and wives remained in the range of 2.5 to 3.5 years
for all birth cohorts born between 1885 and 1940. Yet cohort size fluctuations over this period were
so large that if every woman married a man three years older than her, the number of potential
husbands per woman would fluctuate dramatically, ranging from .9 to 1.25 in periods as short as
five years.
The first part of this paper describes the changes in patterns of age at marriage for each sex.
We show that changes in the age difference between spouses worked in the direction that we predict
to respond to changes in sex ratios. Relative proportions of males and females marrying also move
in the direction we predict in response to changing sex ratios.
We discuss a model of marriage market assignments that can be directly tested against the
Swedish experience. In this model, the efficient assignment of marriage partners across birth cohorts
can be interpreted as a linear programming assignment problem. We apply a very simple version
of our model to the Swedish historical data. This model assumes a payoff matrix in marriages have
husbands three years older than their wives, with deviations from this ideal penalized according
to a quadratic loss function. The model attempts to assign partners to all men and women born
during the period 1895-1945, using only adjustments in the age difference between spouses to
respond to fluctuating cohort sizes. Using the linear program to find the optimal set of marriage
assignments between cohorts, we are able to almost perfectly replicate the rapid fluctuations in the
age difference between spouses actually observed in Sweden for the cohorts born between 1915 and
1925. This is the period of the most dramatic fluctuations in cohort size in recent Swedish history.
The success of our much simplified model of marriage assignments in replicating actual Swedish
marriage patterns during this period indicates that we have captured fundamental features of the
way the marriage market responds to changes in the relative supplies of males and females.
Our model is less successful at tracking the steady decline in the age difference between spouses
beginning with the late 1920's cohorts. We believe that there are two major sources of divergence
between the predictions of our model and historical outcomes. First, our implementation of the as-
signment problem did not allow the proportions marrying to adjust to excess supplies or demands.
Second, we assumed that the optimal age difference between husband and wives has remained
constant over the entire period. Encouraged by our ability to capture some of the major features
of Swedish marriage experience using a model in which adjustments occur only in the age dif-
ference between spouses, we will attempt to enrich our model to incorporate nonstationarity and
adjustments in proportions marrying.
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